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Psychologists and cognitive scientists have long drawn insights and evidence from stage
magic about human perceptual and attentional errors. We present a complementary
analysis of conjuring tricks that seeks to understand the experience of impossibility
that they produce. Our account is first motivated by insights about the constructional
aspects of conjuring drawn from magicians’ instructional texts. A view is then presented
of the logical nature of impossibility as an unresolvable contradiction between a
perception-supported belief about a situation and a memory-supported expectation. We
argue that this condition of impossibility is constructed not simply throughmisperceptions
and misattentions, but rather it is an outcome of a trick’s whole structure of events.
This structure is conceptualized as two parallel event sequences: an effect sequence
that the spectator is intended to believe; and a method sequence that the magician
understands as happening. We illustrate the value of this approach through an analysis
of a simple close-up trick, Martin Gardner’s Turnabout. A formalism called propositional
dynamic logic is used to describe some of its logical aspects. This elucidates the nature
and importance of the relationship between a trick’s effect sequence and its method
sequence, characterized by the careful arrangement of four evidence relationships:
similarity, perceptual equivalence, structural equivalence, and congruence. The analysis
further identifies two characteristics of magical apparatus that enable the construction of
apparent impossibility: substitutable elements and stable occlusion.
Keywords: stage magic, conjuring, propositional logic, impossibility
INTRODUCTION
The methods of stage magicians have long been regarded as a potential source of insight into the
workings of the human mind. Around the turn of the nineteenth century, several leading figures in
the new psychological sciences extended an interest in visual illusions to the illusions of stage magic
(e.g., Binet, 1894; Jastrow, 1900; Triplett, 1900). Connections between magic and psychology have
been made periodically since then (e.g., Kelley, 1980; Hyman, 1989), including links to cognitive
science (Kuhn et al., 2008) and cognitive neuroscience (e.g., Macknik et al., 2008; Parris et al., 2009;
Leeuwen, 2011). The premise underlying all of these investigations is that conjuring tricks, that
routinely and reliably bring about radical failures in how people make sense of the world, might
open a new window into how that sense is normally achieved.
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Many of these investigations have focussed on understanding
localized points of perceptual or attentional failure within the
performance of a magic trick (e.g., Cui et al., 2011; Kuhn and
Martinez, 2011). In this paper, we seek to complement this line of
research by exploring a parallel question of how spectators reach
an experience of witnessing something impossible. This requires
a different kind of explanation to that for how misperceptions
and misattentions occur. In the course of normal life, people
frequently misperceive or misattend relevant events but this
almost never produces the dramatic experiences of impossibility
that characterize successful magic tricks. Rather, people typically
discount everyday anomalies in their sense-making through
metacognitive awareness of the fallibility of their perceptual,
attentional and cognitive systems. The question arises, then, as to
how it is that a spectator of a trick, who has also misperceived or
misattended events, does not simply discount the final magical
effect because they aware are that sensory information and
therefore sense-making is fallible. To reach its conclusion, a
magic trick must be designed and performed not only to deceive
perception and attention, but also to trap the human mind in a
situation where the only sense that can be made is of something
impossible having occurred.
In this article, we attempt to develop an account of the
logical form of beliefs that a spectator of a conjuring trick
holds to underpin the experience of witnessing an impossible
event. In this way, we seek to add to recent mathematically-
based treatments of magic more generally, both in the workings
of tricks (e.g., Diaconis and Graham, 2011) and in theorizing
about their computational aspects (e.g., Williams and McOwan,
2014). Our aim is to show that the precision in expression
mandated by the demands of assigning meaning to the
components of logical formalisms can serve to illuminate
the underlying complexity of beliefs that underpin even a
simple conjuring trick. This complements other logical and
computational treatments of related experiences such as surprise
(e.g., Ortony and Partridge, 1987; Casati and Pasquinelli, 2007;
Lorini and Castelfranchi, 2007; Macedo et al., 2009), as well as
accounts of surprise frommathematical (Baldi and Itti, 2010) and
psychological (Maguire et al., 2011) perspectives. In these studies,
surprise is generally regarded as a belief-based phenomenon,
associated with disconfirmed expectations. Some approaches
have considered how an event is processed, represented, and
integrated within an unfolding scenario theorized as a sequence
of world states, successively changing by the application of
actions (e.g., Maguire et al., 2011). We adopt a similar approach
to the understanding of impossibility.
An important premise of our analysis is that to understand
how an experience of impossibility is reached demands an
understanding of the full sequence of a trick’s events. Kelley
(1980) took a similar approach in a qualitative analysis of magic
tricks from the perspective of attribution theory. For a particular
card trick, the “Whispering Queen,” he mapped out its structure
in terms of an “apparent causal sequence” in seven steps, of
what the spectator perceives, against the corresponding events
of a “real causal sequence.” It was discrepancies between the
two sequences seen as a whole that resulted in the experience
of an “extraordinary or supernatural cause-effect” relation. Our
aim is to take the essence of Kelley’s approach further, albeit
with different terms and concepts, and thereby to focus on
what we will refer to as the constructional aspects of conjuring
tricks. As with Kelley, we consider how a trick’s events are
organized, as distinct from the affective aspects of the story that
they project. This focus on event structure rather than story
meaning resembles work in the field of narratology that studies
the event structures of all narrative forms, including literature,
drama and film (e.g., Landa and Onega, 2014). This is not to
deny the importance of the affective aspects of conjuring, as
argued by a long line of insightful magicians including Sharpe
(1932), Nelms (1969) and Burger and Neale (2009). Rather,
our premise is that we can independently and usefully analyse
the underlying structure and logic of event sequences that
create apparently impossible outcomes. This entails not just
misperceived and misattended events, but the larger sequence
of false and genuine actions and objects that make up a trick’s
performance. By implication, we focus not only on perceptual
and attentional errors, but also on veridical cognitions and the
metacognitive aspects of what agents believe about their beliefs
and percepts. In this way, we hope to contribute to recent
approaches that seek broader theories of conjuring across a
range of cognitive aspects (Kuhn et al., 2014; Rensink and Kuhn,
2015).
As our starting point, the next section draws insights from
magicians’ texts about the constructional aspects of tricks.
Following this, we develop some logical formalisms that express
a general account of how an impossible situation comes about
through a magic trick. To illustrate the concepts in action and to
explore them further, a particular trick is then analyzed: Martin
Gardner’s Turnabout (Fulves, 1977, p. 88). It is important to
emphasize that our treatment does not attempt to do justice to
the full richness of the conjuror’s craft. Instead we concentrate on
the structure of a very simple trick with a single effect, and do not
address the higher-level aspects of conjuring like routining, effect
repetition, double-bluffs and false exposés; these latter things now
familiar through performers such as Penn and Teller, and Derren
Brown. Nevertheless we contend that important principles can
be extracted from the simplest forms of conjuring. The article
concludes with comments on the insights gained and the issues
arising from our analysis.
INSIGHTS FROM MAGICIANS’ TEXTS
ABOUT THE CONSTRUCTIONAL ASPECTS
OF CONJURING TRICKS
The seminal writings of magicians about their craft contain a
central core of ideas and principles about the way conjuring
tricks should be constructed to be effective. We will briefly
review these ideas from the emergence of the modern style
of conjuring in the middle of nineteenth century onwards
(Smith, 2015). This starts with the writings of the great French
magician Jean Eugène Robert-Houdin, especially his two most
famous instructional books: Les secrets de la prestidigitation
et de la magie (Robert-Houdin, 1868) and Magie et Physique
Amusante (Robert-Houdin, 1877). Robert-Houdin practiced and
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espoused a style of performance in which actions and objects
were presented as being somehow natural, and it was ensured
that apparatus and events were seen clearly and readily followed
by audiences. The great British magician David Devant and
Neville Maskelyne, of the famous Maskelyne family of conjurors,
confirmed this approach in even stronger terms and in greater
detail in their book Our Magic published in 1911. Also highly
significant are the later writings of Sharpe (1932, and many
others) who promoted greater dramatic meaning in conjuring
effects. An American magician, Dariel Fitzkee, later popularized
and extended many of the ideas in from these earlier works in an
influential trilogy, including The Trick Brain (Fitzkee, 1944) and
Magic andMisdirection (Fitzkee, 1945). As the popularity of stage
magic declined from the 1920s onwards, new voices emerged in
conjuring theory and practice from the realm of close-up magic
performed for small gatherings of spectators. Highly influential
are the thinking of the great Canadian-born Dai Vernon and
the Argentinian-born Slydini, documented respectively by the
magicians Ganson (1957) and Fulves (1976). Vernon’s appeal
to naturalness is firmly in the lineage of Robert-Houdin, and
Maskelyne and Devant. Many general instructional texts on
magic tricks have incorporated general reflections on the craft
and so are relevant to this analysis. Here our selection of writings
is more arbitrary but includes insights from notable magicians
Jean Hugard and Harry Lorayne. In 1999, Peter Lamont and
Richard Wiseman provided a concise and insightful account for
non-magicians of many of these ideas and techniques, and this is
also drawn on here. In recent years, a number of new significant
works dedicated to the theory of conjuring have appeared that
confirm many of the traditional tenets of the modern style of
conjuring, while also challenging aspects and adding important
new perspectives. From these we draw on Eugene Burger and
Robert Neale’s Magic and Meaning (Burger and Neale, 2009),
Tommy Wonder and Stephen Minch’s (Wonder and Minch,
1996) The Books of Wonder, and Darwin Ortiz’s Strong Magic
(Ortiz, 1994).
Magic Tricks As Impossible State
Transitions
An important starting point for our account is to see the effect
of a magic trick as an impossible state transition in which a
situation passes impossibly from one state to another. We focus
on tricks that fit this conception, describing them as happenings.
In happenings, there is nothing intrinsically impossible, nor even
anomalous, about the final state of objects on display (e.g., the
non-existence of a coin in a purse, or the existence of a ball under
a cup). Rather, the impossibility lies in how the present situation
came about from the immediate history of witnessed events. This
contrasts with other tricks, that might be called spectacles, which
take the form of impossible situations presented for extended
viewing (e.g., the levitation of a human body, the display of a
person cut in two separated halves, or the display of a playing
card as impossibly twisted so that its top and bottom face in
different directions). Kelley (1980) drew a similar distinction in
his account, referring to happenings as “violations of cause-effect
expectations” and spectacles as “violations of entity properties.”
A state transition approach resonates with the writings of
many conjuring theorists: in “any magical feat ... something or
somebody is caused to pass mysteriously from one place or
condition to another” (Maskelyne andDevant, 1911, p. 43). Many
attempts to define a taxonomy of the effects of stage magic
(e.g., Sharpe, 1932; Fitzkee, 1944; Lamont and Wiseman, 1999)
reflect a state transition view. For example, Sharpe’s “magical
plots” distinguished seven classes in which the first four illustrate
a strong state transition perspective: “1. Productions (from not
being to being)” such as producing a coin from nowhere; “2.
Disappearances (from being to not being)” such as making the
coin disappear again; “3. Transformations (from being in this way
to being in that way)” including changes in an object with respect
to its color, size, number, shape, weight; and, “4. Transpositions
(from being here to being there)” such as making a coin jump
magically from the magician’s hand to being under a previously
empty cup.
In addition to our focus on happenings rather than spectacles,
we also focus on tricks that are strictly impossible (e.g., the
sudden transformation of the queen of diamonds into the three of
spades) as opposed to those that are highly improbable but strictly
possible by chance (e.g., a thought-of-card later being chosen
at random by a spectator). By concentrating on impossible
happenings, we put emphasis on the logical and constructional
aspects of magic tricks and avoid the complication ofmixing logic
and probability (Teigen et al., 2013).
The Principle of Naturalness
Having taken a view of magic effects as impossible state
transitions, we will now identify some generally accepted ideas
or principles of performance that concern the constructional
aspects of trick design. Perhaps the overriding principle of
modern conjuring since Robert-Houdin is the idea of presenting
actions and events as being natural (e.g., Smith, 2015), a notion
that still permeates most conjuring texts. Fulves (1976, p. 14),
discussing the great close-up magician Slydini, wrote: “The
situation must appear natural, exactly as it would if no secret
moves were performed”; and later, “Naturalness is an anesthetic
to attention” (Fulves, 1976, p. 94). This points to the importance
of the metacognitive aspects of deception: “The first thing that
is learned is that deception depends entirely upon doing things
in such a manner that it seems there is no attempt at deception”
(John Scarne, attributed by Fitzkee, 1945, p. 224). Although an
over-emphasis on naturalness has been criticized as potentially
leading to mundane performance (Sharpe, 1932; Burger and
Neale, 2009), it nevertheless persists as perhaps the most general
principle of conjuring performance.
The Principle of the Whole
Alongside naturalness, another key principle is that the
production of impossible effects depends on the entire sequence
of a trick’s events, not just the faked or false actions and objects.
This is a key premise of the present account, and to make it
explicit we will describe it as the principle of the whole, although
it is typically not given a name. The idea is expressed clearly by
Maskelyne and Devant who saw every part of a trick as working
in relation with the other parts to produce the effect, and that
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any unnecessary elements should be removed for artistic purity.
A trick should contain “nothing beyond one continuous chain of
essential details, leading to one definite effect” (Maskelyne and
Devant, 1911, p. 22).
As described by Sharpe, the events of magic tricks can be
divided into two parts. First is the typically longer “complication”
or “preparation” phase in which apparatus is showed and
displayed, elements are moved into readiness, and the procedure
is explained. Second is the typically sudden “climax” when an
impossible magical event is seen to have taken place. As noted
by Fulves (1976, p. 17), the preparation must follow a purpose
in leading to the climax, “... handling the spectator in such
a way that he is first made to recognize the impossibility of
what the magician is attempting; then he witnesses the dramatic
realization of the impossible.”
Both parts of the trick, preparation and climax, typically
include a seamless mix of genuine and false objects and actions;
the magician “cleverly, skillfully, and dexterously mixes the true
with the false” (Fitzkee, 1944, p. 34). The critical point is that
the situation as a whole becomes discrepant from the spectator’s
understanding of it, as soon as at least one false object has been
brought into play or one false action taken. This discrepancy
often exists from the outset of the trick or from early on in the
procedure. Once the situation is discrepant from the spectator’s
beliefs, even genuine objects and genuine actions become
deceptive, because their implications for the situation as a whole
is other than it seems. Fitzkee wrote: “the performer should be
particularly careful that his handling of all of his properties, in
every respect, is in keeping with what they are purported to be,
at all times” (Fitzkee, 1944, p. 94; original emphasis). Hence
we see throughout magic instruction great emphasis on what is
often called presentation: “... remember that sleights are merely
a means to an end ... Unless they are surrounded by proper
presentations and routines, they are worthless” (Lorayne, 1976,
p. ix); and “This naturalness must not be used in a narrow sense,
but also in a general sense; it must be used in everything ... not
only in the sleights, but in everything you do” (Dai Vernon,
reported in Ganson, 1957, p. 34).
The Principle of Clarity
What is essential to the modern style of conjuring since Robert-
Houdin, is that the events of the preparation must be clear
and readily comprehended by spectators. “The Preparation
is to be made deliberately so that there is no chance of the
audience missing or forgetting an incident” wrote Sharpe (1932,
p. 54). Sharpe’s vital point is that at the magic climax of a trick,
the spectator must hold a sufficiently clear memory of the
events that they believe did, and did not, happen. As Sharpe
further indicated: “To do this needs considerable artistic skill in
construction” (Sharpe, 1932, pp. 51/52).
Maskelyne and Devant (1911) proposed several rules of
performance, many of which explicitly promote clarity: “avoid
complexity” and “each effect is clear and distinct.” Fitzkee (1944,
p. 34) confirmed this view: “All is built upon an unshakable
foundation of naturalness, plausibility, and conviction. Here is
the real skill! Here are the genuine secrets!” Vernon echoed the
principle in his fundamental rules of magic: “Avoid confusion
at all cost” (quoted in Cervon, 1988, p. iii). In a more specific
statement, Simon (1952, p. 23) paid the following tribute to
the conjuror Francis Carlyle: “One of the main reasons for
his success is that he emphasizes, re-emphasizes, and over-
emphasizes his effects. When he performs, there can be no doubt
as to what the effect is: what has occurred. He makes his effects
clear-cut, straightforward, and positively certain. If he changes a
red card into a black card, you can be sure that everyone is fully
aware of what the card was before the change, and what the card
has changed to ....”. Again, this principle is carried forward by
today’s magicians: “In effects like ‘Three-Card Monte’ and the
‘Shell Game’ the audience has to try to keep track of the winning
card or the pea ... If you were to shift the props around so rapidly
or so extensively that it required real concentration to keep track,
the effect would certainly fail” (Ortiz, 1994, p. 35).
The Principle of Focus
Working in tandem with the aim for clarity is the principle
of focus, referring to the way that objects and actions move
in and out of focal attention as the trick proceeds. While the
term “misdirection” is widely used by magicians, and the wider
public, most conjuring theorists have preferred to talk about the
way spectators are actively directed to attend to parts of the
procedure. This is not only to prevent detection of false objects
and actions but also to ensure that things are generally clear:
“While the magician must use all his art to disguise and cover
up what he does not require to be seen, he is equally bound
to make sure that every moment and every detail that ought to
be seen shall be seen” (Maskelyne and Devant, 1911, p. 122).
The Dutch conjuror TommyWonder (Wonder and Minch 1996,
p. 13) indicated how control of focus relates to the principles of
clarity and of the whole: “When we perform as magicians, our
job consists of more than simply hiding the secret. That is just
a small part of our objective. Much more important is that we
highlight the important details, those things that are necessary
if the audience is to understand and follow the action and its
intended meaning”. An important point here is that spectators
are influenced through indirect “invited inferences” (Hyman,
1989) rather than direct assertions which elicit suspicion. For
example, “direct repudiation,” stating explicitly that some object
or action is “normal,” is universally condemned (e.g., Maskelyne
and Devant, 1911, p. 130). “Implication is always stronger than a
direct statement” wrote Fitzkee (1944, p. 97).
The Principle of the Incidental
Allied to controlling the focus of attention, is the manipulation of
what appears necessary to the trick’s plot and what is incidental.
Sawing a box in two is necessary; passing the saw from one
hand to the other is incidental. When performing covers for
secret sleights or actions, a key technique is to choreograph
them as incidental stepping stones between the supposedly
more pivotal elements of the procedure. Hugard and Braue
(1940, p. 444) described “the importance of the inconsequential”:
“never place too much importance in your sleights, lest you
telegraph to the onlookers that the sleight is about to take
place.” ... “The rule, subject to exception to which all rules are
subject, is to treat as unimportant that which you really wish
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to conceal” (Hugard and Braue, 1940, p. 445). Lorayne (1976,
p. ix) put it: “I have used the words ‘nonchalant’ and the
phrase, ‘without hesitation,’ to the point of redundancy in this
book.” Vernon (quoted in Ganson, 1957, p. 32) described how
“a sleight should be a secret thing, unheralded, unhurried and
unseen.”
A major challenge of trick construction is how to make
a sleight or a cover for a secret action appear natural when
it is contrived to work toward the impossible outcome. One
technique is to manufacture the necessity for the action through
a “ruse” (Fitzkee, 1945). This implies setting up a sub-goal
in the plot and performance of the trick which renders the
cover for the secret action as being an incidental part of a
necessary sub-plot. Examples of ruses are offering an object for
inspection by the audience, or picking up a wand as a tool
to poke around inside a hat to show it is empty. It is in the
incidental activity around these sub-routines that secret actions
often lie.
The Principle of “Blurring Perception and
Inference”
A further principle which bears on how a sense of impossibility
is constructed concerns how the events of a trick’s history, that
are partly or wholly inferred to have taken place, may later be
recalled as having been perceived directly. In practice, much
of the spectator’s understanding of the situation is maintained
through inferences about partially obscured states, like upside
cards or balls under cups. During memory of the procedure, and
even during its perception, spectators may not be fully aware of
the boundary between the perceptual and inferential basis of their
beliefs. Fitzkee (1945, p. 73) describes a trick where a money bill
is placed in an envelope which is burned: “Rarely, if ever, do the
spectators realize that they haven’t actually seen the banknote
burned.” He elaborates: “The mind has a way of putting together
clues from here and there ... It is an automatic process, the specific
details of which the spectator is totally unaware” (Fitzkee, pp.
82/83).
The Principle of No-Notice and the
Principle of Early Denial
There are many other more specific principles of trick
construction. One example is the rule never to give advanced
notice to the spectator of how the trick will end, or to repeat
the same trick on the same occasion (e.g., Robert-Houdin,
1868; Maskelyne and Devant, 1911). To do either of these,
gives the spectator too much guidance on what to scrutinize
closely during the preparation stage. Another minor principle
is that the procedure must be designed to quickly deny or at
least contain possible explanations for the trick. During the
preparation phase of the trick, actions should attempt to rule out
explanations before they become well-formed suspicions: “Also it
is evident that the spectators might get the idea that the banknote
was ‘planted.’ So the performer takes care of this situation
ahead of time” (Fitzkee, 1945, p. 56). These pre-emptive strikes
must deflect not only suspicions about the genuine method
of the trick, but also other possible explanations: “even wrong
theories must be ruled out of spectators’ minds” (Sharpe, 1932,
p. 74).
A FORMAL ANALYSIS OF THE
CONSTRUCTION OF IMPOSSIBILITY
Drawing on these broad principles of magic trick construction,
we now attempt to sketch the beginnings of a more formal
account of how a belief in an impossible event is constructed.
This offers a more precise understanding, although inevitably
it sacrifices the richness and depth of the magicians’ instructive
principles. In the following, we first develop a definition of
impossibility which allows us to better articulate the question that
our account seeks to address. We then conceptualize how the
experience of impossibility might arise. As Figure 1 shows, our
account focuses on the relationship between two parallel event
sequences that run over the course of a trick’s performance: an
effect sequence of events intended for the spectator to perceive and
believe and which culminate in the experience of impossibility;
and a method sequence of events known about by the magician,
including states and actions kept secret from the spectator, which
provides a non-magical description of what happens during the
trick.
Impossibility as an Expectation
Contradiction in the Effect Sequence of
Events
We start with the view that impossibility arises as a conflict
between a perception-supported believed state for a current
situation, let’s call it ψ, and an expected state 8 for that same
situation; for example, a conflict between a currently perceived
rabbit in a hat, coupled with an expectation that the hat is empty.
For such conflicts to achieve a sense of impossibility depends on
two things. Firstly, states ψ and 8 must be negations of each
other, implying that they cannot both be true. The hat cannot
have a rabbit in it and be empty. Secondly, the expected state 8
must be supported by a memory of having perceived and believed
a history of past states (ψ1...ψn) commencing from the trick’s
beginning (time t1) and leading to the end of the trick (time tn),
and a related sequence of actions (α1 ... αn−1) that together would
normally lead to the expected state 8. Continuing the example,
the spectator of the rabbit in the hat must have a memory of
perceiving and believing in a series of states and actions from
time t1 onwards, which support the expectation of the hat being
currently empty at time tn. This history of believed states and
actions constitutes the effect sequence of the trick.
Here, and later in the article, we will capture these ideas
informally using propositional dynamic logic, a formalism that
was first defined by Fischer and Ladner (1979), and has been
widely used in the analysis of computer programs. We refrain
from a complete definition of that logic, but rather use the
elements that are needed in a descriptive way to identify the key
propositions being made. However, a full formal account in this
logic could also be given.
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Impossibility as an Expectation Contradiction in the Effect Sequence of Events
We define the condition in which a spectator experiences a situation to be impossible as:
impossible(S, ψ) = believes(S, ψ) & expects(S, 8) & ψ = ¬ 8
where, S denotes a spectator
ψ denotes the currently believed state of the situation
8 denotes the currently expected state of the situation
ψ = ¬ 8 indicates that not both can be true
To identify what gives rise to the belief and what gives rise to the expectation, we first declare a history of 1 .. n states and actions which lead to the impossible
situation comprising a final believed state, ψn, and a final expected state, 8n.
Support for the final believed state comes directly from perceptual evidence:
believes(S, ψn)← perceives(S, λn)
Where,
← denotes that the perception implies the belief
λ stands for the “actual” situation, as explained in the section “The Method Sequence of Events”.
Support for the memory-based expectation comes from:
expects(S, 8n)← believes(S, believed(S, ψ1...ψn−1 ) )
& believes(S, DONE(α1... αn−1 ))
& believes(S, support(8n, ψ1...ψn−1, α1... αn−1 ))
This asserts that S expects 8n to be true because she believes that she previously believed in the sequence of states ψ1...ψn−1 before arriving at the current state
ψn; and S also believes that the sequence of actions α1... αn−1 has been done; and that normally by performing action α1 one gets from ψ1 to ψ2 and so on, and
that the last action αn−1 would normally lead from ψn−1 to 8n.
FIGURE 1 | A general model of a simple trick’s event structure showing two parallel event sequences: an effect event sequence, that is believed to
have occurred by the spectator, and a method event sequence, understood by the magician to have occurred. The figure illustrates the particular case of
there being six discrete time episodes, while in general there could any number greater than one. Impossibility is experienced at the end of the trick when three final
states are distinguished: an expected state (supported by memory of the event history) which is in contradiction with a believed state (supported by current
perception) and a method state of how the magician understands the final situation. The diagram also depicts a common (but not universal) pattern of evidence
relationships in which stronger evidence exists at the beginning and end of the sequences (depicted as shorter evidence relationship arrows) and weaker evidence
exists in the middle of the sequences (depicted as longer evidence relationship arrows). This common pattern is discussed in the text.
In this account, then, impossibility exists as a contradiction
between a perception-supported belief ψ and a memory-
supported belief8. The question that we seek to address through
the following analysis is how does such a contradiction arise?
Why does an agent retain both beliefs when normal sense-
making mechanisms might be expected to discount the weaker
belief in favor of the stronger, or to discount both? How is it
that a cognitive agent, in this case a spectator, comes to hold two
inconsistent beliefs?
In practice, the impossibility condition is reached in
different ways in different conjuring tricks. But typically,
and in line with previous accounts of conjuring, it depends
on misperceptions and misattentions of the trick’s events.
However, what our constructional emphasis asserts is that
reaching the impossibility condition also depends on a
carefully crafted history of events, including both their veridical
and false aspects. It is how this history of veridical and
false elements are constructed within the larger sequence
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of events that is critical to reaching the condition of
impossibility.
The Method Sequence of Events: “Actual”
States and Actions
While the impossibility condition has been defined chiefly in
terms of two states, a perceived situation ψ and an expected
situation 8, a third state is also relevant. We will call this the
method state, denoted as λ, referring to the state that is believed
to hold true by another agent such as the magician who knows
how the trick is done. The method state might informally be
called the “actual situation” in the sense that it renders the trick as
something possible rather than impossible. For the trick to work,
and for impossibility to be achieved, it is necessary that λ is taken
by spectators to be ψ. Extending this further, we can conceive of
λ as the end point of a second sequence of events which define
how the magician understands the full history of the trick. As
shown in Figure 1, this method sequence can be conceived as a
parallel sequence of method states (λ1...λn) and method actions
(β1... βn−1).
On reaching the condition of impossibility, because of its
inherent contradiction, the spectator will scrutinize the situation
in search of new evidence to modify or discount ψ or 8 or both,
so as to render the situation as being possible. The perceptually-
based belief in ψ can be scrutinized by further examination of
the current situation, while belief in the expected state 8 can be
scrutinized only through reconsideration of remembered events.
For the final perception-based belief ψn, scrutiny means asking
the question how did ψn−1 become ψn under action αn−1? How
did the empty hat become the hat with a rabbit inside, just by
tapping it with a wand? This might entail searching for a hidden
method state λn which is close to the expected state 8n but just
appears to be ψn. In our example, the spectator might first check
to see that it is a real rabbit and not a fluffy toy that is easily
folded away. But this search is typically fruitless because the final
method state λn is closer to the perceived state ψn and the two
are not easily discriminable, and both are very different to the
final expected state 8n. In our example, both λn and ψn involve
a real live rabbit and this is the seemingly impossible element,
because it is irreconcilable with the firm expectation that the hat
should still be empty (8n). The question becomes how does this
contradictory pattern of beliefs come about?
Evidence Relationships between the Effect
and Method Sequences
Figure 1 depicts how the spectator typically reaches this
experience of impossibility through a sequence of method states
and actions that secretly takes the actual situation away from the
effect sequence during the course of the trick. That is, the unusual
final situation of the trick comes about through the parallel and
incremental construction of two contradictory outcomes: the
effect sequence builds the spectator’s expectation in 8n, and the
method sequence builds a different final state λn which is readily
perceived by the spectator as the contradictory state ψn.
This brings us to the question of how the method events
remain hidden and unsuspected during the performance of the
trick. At each moment, a method state λ gives off evidence
that leads to a corresponding believed state ψ. Similarly, each
method action β gives off evidence that leads to a corresponding
believed action α. Figure 1 depicts this as a series of evidence
relationships between each pair of corresponding states and
actions in the effect and method sequences. We will now identify
four important kinds of evidence relationship that might hold
(summarized in Table 1), although there may be others. These
form a pivotal part of our account. Each evidence relationship
defines how the method state λ is taken to provide evidence for
the corresponding belief in ψ, and likewise for actions.
Although the examples given in this section all relate to states,
the four evidence relationships also apply to actions. Further, they
are ordered in their level of strength to withstand scrutiny: from
similarity (weakest), through perceptual equivalence, structural
equivalence, to congruence (strongest). As we explore in the next
section, this strength bears on the role they typically play in the
design of a trick’s event structure and how they contribute to its
impossible outcome.
Similarity
This relationship holds when there is at least one small
inconsistency between the method state λ and the believed state
ψ. An inconsistency means that a proposition entailed by one
state is negated by a proposition entailed by the other state,
and therefore λ and ψ cannot both be true. Under similarity,
inconsistencies are apparent in the perceptual evidence given off
by λ and so could be detected through greater perceptual scrutiny
of the situation. But in practice, because the inconsistencies are
small, they likely go unnoticed by the spectator who continues to
accept the believed state ψ as holding true. For example, suppose
the spectator believes state ψ, the 10 of diamonds is lying face
up on the table, while the magician knows of a corresponding
method state λ in which the card on the table is specially faked to
resemble the 10 diamonds with the label “10” but only 9 pips. The
spectator does not notice this difference, though closer scrutiny
(counting the pips) would reveal the inconsistency between ψ
and λ.
Perceptual Equivalence
This also concerns cases when there are inconsistencies between
λ and ψ. But now the consistencies are not visible because the
available perceptual evidence given off by λ is identical to that
which would be given off by ψ. Under perceptual equivalence,
the inconsistencies between λ and ψ could be detected by
intervening in the situation to obtain further perceptual
evidence. For example, the spectator believes ψ, that the queen
of diamonds is lying face down on the table, while the magician
knows λ, that the two of clubs is lying face down on the table. No
amount of scrutiny of the available perceptual evidence would
reveal an inconsistency between ψ and λ. But obtaining new
perceptual evidence, for example turning the card over, would
reveal a difference.
Structural Equivalence
Again this applies to cases for which inconsistencies exist between
λ and ψ. However now, not only is the available perceptual
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TABLE 1 | Four types of evidence relationship between effect events and method events.
Relationship between corresponding elements in the
effect and method event sequences
Actions which might reveal inconsistencies between
corresponding elements of the effect and method event
sequences
Similarity Appearing similar but with small inconsistencies in the
available perceptual evidence. (e.g., Effect state: a 10 of
diamonds is shown; Method state: the card has one pip
missing.)
Shifting attention to discrepancies between method and effect, or
scrutinizing relevant states and actions more closely. (e.g., Counting
the pips on the card.)
Perceptual equivalence Inconsistencies exist but are not apparent in the available
perceptual evidence, though they are apparent in aspects of
the situation that are currently hidden. (e.g., Effect state: a
card believed to be the 10 of diamonds is face down on the
table; Method state: the 10 of clubs is face down on the
table.)
Intervening in the situation to gain new perceptual evidence that reveals
an inconsistency between method and effect. (e.g., Turning the card
over to see its face.)
Structural equivalence Inconsistencies exist but are not apparent through any
evidence that could be extracted from the current situation,
though they are apparent in comparisons to earlier states in
the event sequence. (e.g., Effect state: A card that was
previously on the top of the pack is now face up on the table;
Method state: The card on the table was previously second in
the pack.)
Comparing aspects of the current state with remembered previous
states in the event sequence. (e.g., Noticing a blemish on the tabled
card, and remembering that the previously top card did not have this
blemish.)
Congruence No inconsistencies exist. (e.g., Effect state: The 10 of
diamonds lies face up on the table; Method state: The 10 of
diamonds lies face up on the table.)
No action can reveal an inconsistency.
evidence given off by λ identical to that for ψ, but also no
amount of intervention in the current situation to gain further
perceptual evidence could reveal an inconsistency between them.
Under structural equivalence, the inconsistencies that exist can
be revealed only by comparing the current situation against
memories of past states. For example, the spectator believes state
ψ, that the face down card on the table is whatever card was on
the top of the pack at an earlier time, while the magician knows
that the same tabled card is whatever card was on the bottom
of the pack at that earlier time. No amount perceptual scrutiny
or intervention, such as turning the card face up, or change of
attentional focus could expose an inconsistency between λ and
ψ. However, the inconsistency could be revealed by remembering
what card was on the top of the pack earlier and finding a way to
compare it with the tabled card. For example, the spectator might
remember that the previous top card had a blemish that the tabled
card does not have.
Congruence
The evidence relationship of congruence is different to the others
in that it holds when there are no inconsistencies between the
situation as believed by the spectator, ψ, and that known by the
magician, λ. The two states may entail different propositions,
but no proposition entailed by one is inconsistent with any
proposition entailed by the other; therefore, ψ and λ could
both be true. No further collection or scrutiny of perceptual
or memorial evidence, even if perfect, could reveal the two
situations as being inconsistent. For example, the spectator
believes that the face down card is the four of clubs, and the
magician knows that the face down card is the four of clubs. The
magician and the spectator may know or believe various other
things about the situation, but none of these are inconsistent with
the four of clubs being face down on the table.
AN APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPTS TO
MARTIN GARDNER’S TURNABOUT
To illustrate the application of the concepts developed, we now
present an analysis of a particular magic trick, Turnabout (Fulves,
1977) invented by the popular mathematician Martin Gardner.
Turnabout is chosen an example of a simple trick in that it
presents a single effect using unfaked props, and has what
magicians call a clean entry and a clean ending, meaning that
everything is free for inspection by a spectator at the beginning
and at the end. Even this simple trick will be seen to rest
on a carefully crafted pattern of beliefs. Turnabout also has a
sufficiently complex trajectory of hidden events to make it a
valuable illustration of the account. In the following, we first
present a purely textual description of Turnabout, followed by
a more detailed analysis. Figure 2 serves as an illustration of
both the informal description and the application of the formal
concepts. A video demonstrating Turnabout is also included as
supplementary material for this article (Video 1).
An Informal Description of Turnabout
Turnabout is performed on a flat surface using 10 identical coins
and a sheet of paper approximately 25 cm square. The effect is
that a triangular array of coinsmagically transforms itself to point
in the opposite direction. This occurs as an apparent sympathetic
reaction to a piece of paper being placed over the triangle and
turned through 180◦. In the version described here, the sheet of
paper has an equilateral triangle drawn on one side to mirror the
coins and to mark its direction of facing.
Figure 2 shows Turnabout in six steps with illustrative patter.
Assume that the magician and a spectator face each other across
a table on which the trick is performed.
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FIGURE 2 | An analysis of the trick Turnabout which shows it as an instantiation of the general model shown in Figure 1.
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Step 1. The magician places 10 coins on the table in the
formation of a triangle. The magician points out that the apex
of the coin triangle points upwards toward the spectator.
Step 2. The magician places the paper over the coin triangle,
covering it completely. The magician points out that the
triangle drawn on the paper points in the same direction as
the coin triangle.
Step 3. The magician pulls back the paper cover, enough to
reveal the top 2 rows of the coin triangle as a reminder that
it points towards the spectator and that it points in the same
direction as the triangle drawn on the paper.
Step 4. The magician moves the paper forward again to cover
the coin triangle.
Step 5. The magician then rotates the paper through 180
degrees, so that it still covers the coin triangle but is reversed
in orientation and the triangle drawn on the paper now points
down and away from the spectator.
Step 6. The magician slides back the paper to reveal that the
coin triangle has also magically rotated through 180 degrees,
so that its apex now also points down and away from the
spectator!
The secret of the method is that really only three coins are moved,
this being sufficient to create a new triangle that points in the
opposite direction. The movement of the three coins is achieved
in two steps. At step 4, as the coin triangle is re-covered, two
coins are slid forward with the paper (coins G and J in Figure 2).
Later, at step 5, when the card is rotated, the single coin A, at the
apex of the coin triangle, is moved round to the other side of the
configuration as the paper is rotated.
A Detailed Analysis of Turnabout
We now present a more fine-grained description of Turnabout
to illustrate the concepts developed earlier for the construction
of impossibility. Figure 2 shows this interpretation as an
instance of the general model depicted in Figure 1. For each
step of the trick, we give a detailed qualitative account that
operationalizes the concepts, with related logical propositions
shown in accompanying boxes. Although these propositions are
necessarily incomplete, and are therefore descriptive in form,
their value is in distilling the most essential concepts and
relationships.
To frame the account, we describe a world in which the
magic trick occurs, including a magician (M), a spectator (S) and
various objects and actions to be defined. The world is described
as moving through 6 moments in time, equivalent to the 6
steps described. The aim is to provide a description of how the
experience of impossibility is reached by the final step 6, and to
show how it is constructed across the events of the previous steps,
so demonstrating the principle of the whole as described earlier.
The account traces two parallel state paths: an effect sequence,
of what S is led to believe, and a method sequence, of what M
understands as “actually” taking place. The effect sequence is
made up of believed states (ψ) and believed actions (α), while the
method sequence comprises a corresponding set of method states
(λ) and method actions (β). All of these states and actions refer to
physical objects and events in the world of the trick. For each step
of the trick, various propositions are developed to describe how S
comes to develop her beliefs (shown in accompanying boxes for
each of the following sections).
World at Time 1: State 1
The coin triangle (CT, as labelled in the accompanying
formalisms) is presented with the paper cover, in a position down
below the coins (paperdown), and M draws the attention of the
spectator (S) to them through patter (see Figure 2) or gesture,
or simply by bringing them into the zone of performance. It
is only at this time 1 and later at the final time 6, that S is
able to perceive the whole situation comprising all the coins
and the paper cover. S therefore forms a belief about CT and
the paper that is fully supported by perception and which is
underpinned by a relationship of congruence with the method
state. This belief encompasses the overall configuration of CT as
pointing upwards, and also the position of the paper cover and
its matching upwards orientation as shown by the triangle drawn
on it. The principles of naturalness and clarity are vital here, and
indeed throughout the trick, to avoid constant suspicion that
other actions and objects are at play; though for simplicity we
will take them as assumed and do not refer to them explicitly.
Another important aspect of the world at time 1, relating
to the principle of focus, is that there are many details that are
World at time 1
States
method state λ1 entails the following propositions:
CT {Meaning “There is a coin triangle of 10 coins with a given overall configuration and overall orientation of pointing upwards”.}
& paperdown {Meaning “There is a piece of paper in a position down below the coins and bearing a drawing of a triangle which also has an orientation of
pointing upwards”.}
& position(coinA, p1 ... coinJ, p10) {Meaning “CoinA is at position p1 within CT,” etc.}
& orientation(coinA, o1 ... coinJ, p10) {Meaning “CoinA is at orientation o1,” etc.}
believed state ψ1 entails the following propositions:
CT & paperdown
Support for the believed state
believes(S, ψ1)← perceives(S, λ1) & focuses (S, CT & paperdown) & congruent(S, ψ1, λ1)
This asserts that S perceives the method state λ1, i.e., the situation as M understands it to be true; and S focuses attention on CT and paperdown, but not on the
position and orientation of individual coins; and because ψ1 and λ1 are congruent at time 1, this leads S to believe in ψ1.
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World at time 2
States and actions
method action β1 and believed action α1 both entail: slideup(M, paperdown, CT)
method state λ2 and believed state ψ2 both entail: CT & paperup
ψ1 → [α1 ] ψ2 {Meaning that the action α1 leads from ψ1 to ψ2; from previous time 1, ψ1 entails: CT & paperdown.}
As for time 1, the method state is also likely to entail other propositions about individual coins, but we omit these for simplicity in the remainder of the analysis.
Spectator experience
S experiences the situation as normal because the belief and expectation for the current state are consistent:
confirmation(S, believes(S, ψ2 ), expects(S, ψ2 ) )
Support for the expectation
expects(S, ψ2)← believed(S, ψ1 ) & believes(S, DONE(α1)) & believes(S, ψ1 → [α1 ] ψ2)
where,
believes(S, DONE(α1))← perceived(S, β1) & congruent(S, α1,β1)
This asserts: that S expects ψ2 because she remembers believing in ψ1; and also she believes that action α1 has been done; and that it changes ψ1 into ψ2; and
she believes that action was done because she previously perceived the method action β1, that M understands to have happened; which is congruent with α1 at
time 2.
Support for the believed state
believes(S, ψ2)← perceives(S, visible(S, λ2, paperup)) & congruent(S, ψ2,λ2) & expects(S, ψ2)
This asserts that S believes in ψ2 through a combination of expectation and perception: because she expects ψ2 to be true for the reasons given above; and she
perceives the visible part of situation λ2 i.e., the paper in the up position; and λ2 is congruent with ψ2.
World at time 3
States and actions
method action β2 and believed action α2 both entail: slidedown2(M, paperup, CT) {Meaning to slide the paper down just 2 rows of coins.}
method state λ3 and believed state ψ3 both entail: CT & paperdown2
ψ2 → [α2 ] ψ3 {From previous time 2, ψ2 entails: CT & paperup.}
Spectator experience
confirmation(S, believes(S, ψ3 ) & expects(S, ψ3) )
Again, S experiences this situation as normal because the current believed state and expected state are consistent.
Support for the expectation
This is the same as that for time 2, except that the time is one step forward (i.e., ψ3 replacesψ2, and so on).
Support for the believed state
believes(S, ψ3)← perceives(S, visible(S, λ3, paperdown2 & CTtop2rows)) & focus(S, paperdown2 & CTtop2rows) & congruent(S, ψ3,λ3) & expects(S, ψ3 ) )
This asserts a form of support for the current belief based on an evidence relationship of congruence, like that at time 2 as a mixture of perception and expectation,
except additional support for ψ3 comes from the now visible top two rows of CT; and attention is again focused on the overall configuration of CT rather than on
individual coins.
available to be perceived, but which S will not focus on because
they are not deemed relevant to understanding the situation.
Significantly, focus will be placed on CT, the paper cover and their
overall orientations, and they become part of the believed state.
But individuating details about each coin will not be the subject
of focus; such as their position within the triangle and their
orientation, or distinguishing shininess or blemishes. This lack of
focus on such distinguishing details makes the coins substitutable
for each other, a point we return to later.
World at Time 2: Action 1 and State 2
The first method action, or “actual” action, of M is to slide the
paper up into a position (paperup) where it covers and thereby
hides CT entirely. The whole situation is no longer in view, and
will remain partly obscured until the final state 6 of the trick.
Therefore the continued belief in CT now rests partly on the
expectation for it, and partly on the perception of visible things,
still underwritten by an evidence relationship of congruence. This
mixture of expectation and perception relates to the principle
of blurring perception and inference. The expectation rests on S
believing that the action of sliding up the paper has been done
and that it has not altered the previously believed existence of
CT. S finds this situation normal and non-magical because there
is mutual confirmation between what is believed and what is
expected based on the history of the previous state and action.
World at Time 3: Action 2 and State 3
The next step draws on the principle of the incidental by
introducing an interlude to the main plot which might be
presented by M as an afterthought to confirm or “reinforce”
(Lamont and Wiseman, 1999) what S already believes about the
existence of CT. Having established CT and covered it with the
paper, M now partly slides back the paper (slidedown2) to a
new position (paperdown2) where it reveals the top 2 rows of
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coins (CTtop2rows) but still covers the bottom two rows. This is
done ostensibly to remind S that the coin triangle points upwards
and in the same direction as the triangle drawn on the paper.
As before, the believed situation is produced by a mixture of
expectation and perception. The result is experienced by S as
normal, because the expectation based on the event history so
far is consistent with the visible perceptual evidence. Again, this
is underwritten by the believed events and method events being
congruent.
World at Time 4: Action 3 and State 4
At time 4, the believed action of M sliding the paper back up over
the whole coin triangle (slideup2) reverses the previous action
of time 3. Significantly, however, the method action at time 4,
although similar to the believed action, is different in that it
includes the secret and hidden movement of two coins (G and
J, see Figure 2) from the outer ends of row 4, at the base of CT,
up to row 2. This forms a new configuration of coins that we
will call CW because it is no longer a triangle but resembles the
letter “W.” This first secret movement of the trick has ongoing
consequences for the evidence relationships between believed
and method states. Unlike the simple congruence relationship
that has held so far, the method action, of moving the paper
up two rows plus secretly moving coins G and J, introduces an
inconsistency between effect and method, and exhibits only a
similarity relationship with the believed action of moving just
the paper back up to cover the coins. They are similar in that
the action of moving the paper and the coins up, is likely to be
slightly, yet visibly, different to the simple action of moving the
paper alone. The believed action could therefore be discredited
from the perceptual evidence, because it is subtly different from
themethod action, but this inconsistency is unlikely to be noticed
in practice.
Once the action has been taken, and CW has been formed, the
method state now deviates from that which S believes to be true.
S believes that CT is still intact, based on her belief that moving
the paper up does not change anything except for CT becoming
not visible. What is especially important here, is that the believed
and method states now have a stronger evidence relationship
than similarity, and are now perceptually equivalent. This means
that the inconsistency between them is not apparent in the
available perceptual evidence, although it could be revealed if the
physical objects were investigated; in this case, if the paper was
removed.
FromM’s point of view at time 4, the trick has reached its most
vulnerable condition, because the believed and method states are
highly inconsistent (CT vs. CW). The relationship of perceptual
equivalence between them provides a strong enough protection
against detection, provided that the procedure of the trick soon
continues on beyond this state. Lingering in state 4, would allow
S to question her belief about the continued existence of the
currently hidden CT. Despite the discrepancies between the effect
and method sequences in the world at time 4, S will continue
to regard it as normal and non-magical because there is still
confirmation between what is expected and what is believed to
be the case.
World at Time 5: Action 4 and State 5
Action 4 is the turning of the paper cover through 180◦ so that
it now points downwards but is still in the up position covering
the coins (turnedpaperup). It creates the moment when the trick
moves beyond the preparation of the objects and becomes an
World at time 4
States and actions
method action β3 entails: slideup2(M, paperdown2 & coins(G, J), CT)
believed action α3 entails: slideup2(M, paperdown2, CT)
method state λ4 entails: CW & paperup {CW refers to the coins in a “W” configuration as shown in Figure 2.}
believed state ψ4 entails: CT & paperup
ψ3 → [α3 ] ψ4 {From previous time 3, ψ3 entails: CT & paperup2.}
Spectator experience
confirmation(S, believes(S, ψ4 ) & expects(S, ψ4) )
As before, S experiences this situation as normal because the current believed state and expected state are consistent.
Support for the (now false) expectation
expects(S, ψ4)← believed(S, ψ3 ) & believes (S, DONE(α3)) & believes(S, ψ3 → [α3] ψ4 )
Where,
believes(S, DONE(α3))← perceived(S, β3) & similar(S, α3,β3)
similar(S, α3,β3) means: approximation(perceptual_evidence(S, α3 ), perceptual_evidence(S, β3) )
This asserts that the expectation in ψ4 forms for the same reason as in earlier times, but now rests on the incorrect belief that α3 was done based on having perceived
β3 which is similar to α3.
Support for the (now false) believed state
believes(S, ψ4)← perceives(S, visible(S, λ4, paperup)) & perceptually_equivalent(S, ψ4,λ4) & expects(S, ψ4 )
Where,
perceptually_equivalent(S, ψ4, λ4) means: perceptual_evidence(S, ψ4 ) = perceptual_evidence(S, λ4)
Asserting that support for the belief in ψ4 comes from a mixture of perception, of the visible aspects of the situation, and expectation; combined with perceptual
equivalence between ψ4 and λ4.
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World at time 5
States and actions
believed action α4 entails: turn(M, paperup, CT)
method action β4 entails: turn(M, paperup & coinA, CW)
believed state ψ5 entails: CT & turnedpaperup {Meaning the paper turned downwards but still in the up position over the coins.}
method state λ5 entails: UCT
′ & turnedpaperup
ψ4 → [α4 ] ψ5 {From previous time 4, ψ4 entails: CT & paperup.}
Spectator experience
confirmation(S, believes(S, ψ5 ) & expects(S, ψ5) )
S continues to experience the situation as normal because the perception-supported belief and expectation are consistent.
Support for the (false) believed state and the (false) expected state
These are both supported in the same way as for time 4, except that now time is one step forward (i.e., ψ5 replaces ψ4, and so on).
action that is later purported to have a magical effect. As at time
3, the method action also contains a secret hidden movement,
carrying coin A from the top of CW to the bottom and reversing
the coin’s orientation, so creating an upside-down coin triangle
that we will call UCT′ (the significance of its configuration will be
described in the next section).
The believed action of turning the paper around, over the
top of CT, has an evidence relationship of similarity with the
method action of turning the paper over CW plus the added
movement of coin A. These actions are only similar to each other,
as opposed to be being perceptually equivalent, for two reasons:
(i) the action of carrying coin A with the paper is slightly different
to the action it simulates, and (ii) as the paper turns, the coins
underneath are likely to “flash”, meaning they become briefly
visible to S who could in principle see that they are not positioned
consistently with CT’s configuration. Although similarity is the
weakest evidence relationship, S will likely not notice these
inconsistencies because they occur very briefly during the turn
movement.
In contrast, the resulting method state at time 5 is available
for greater scrutiny because it is static and persists for a longer
duration. What is critical in the trick’s construction, is that there
is now a stronger evidence relationship of perceptual equivalence.
That is, the perceptual evidence given off by the covered UCT′ is
the same as that which would be produced by the covered CT. A
small qualification is that UCT′ is actually one row of coins lower
than the original CT, so we are assuming that the paper is large
enough that its position does not need to be different in the two
situations. Again, despite the growing inconsistencies between
the effect and method sequences, S still finds the believed state as
being normal and consistent with what they expect. As at earlier
times of the trick, S continues to believe in CT even though it is
not visible under cover of the paper.
World at Time 6: Action 5 and the Final State 6
Finally the trick reaches its climax through the method action
5 of sliding down the previously turned paper (slidedown) to
a position below the coins (turnedpaperdown). This reveals the
impossible event: the coin triangle has magically turned upside-
down in sympathy with the preceding turning of the paper. The
experience of impossibility rests on two things being true. Firstly,
there is a negation between the expected state of an upwards-
pointing coin triangle CT, and the perceived state of the coins
arranged as a downwards-pointing or upside-down triangle that
we will call UCT. That is, it is not possible for both CT and
UCT to be true. Secondly, there is strong memory-based support
for the expectation of CT which in some sense matches the
contradictory perceptual support for UCT.
Faced with the final experience of an impossible event,
spectators will scrutinize their perceptual and memorial evidence
more closely in an attempt to resolve the contradiction between
the perceived UCT and the expected CT. What is critically
significant for the success of the trick, at this final state 6, is
that the evidence relationships are now strong. The relationship
between the believed state and the method state presents a
relatively complex situation. Let’s assume that S believes the
perceived upside-down coin triangle, UCT, was created by
rotating the original CT through 180◦; this assumption is
reflected in themarking of coins in the effect sequence of believed
states in Figure 2. In reality, the actual arrangement of the coins is
something quite different, that we have calledUCT′, which results
from the secret method actions of sliding up coins G and J and
then moving coin A to bottom of the configuration and reversing
its orientation.
The result is that the believed and method states, at this
final magical moment, have now taken on a relationship that
is stronger than similiarity and perceptual equivalence, and
achieved the status of structural equivalence. That is, the
inconsistencies betweenUCT andUCT′ are not identifiable in the
presently available perceptual evidence, and further they are not
identifiable in any evidence that might be discoverable through
rearranging the objects or shifting the focus of attention. Yet
UCT and UCT′ fall short of being congruent, because they have
inconsistencies that could be identified by comparison back to
the details of previously encountered states (particularly, states 1
and 3). Such comparisons would depend on remembering details
of individual coins such as blemishes or particular orientations.
However, such details, are extremely unlikely to be available
in memory at the time of state 6. As noted, this is therefore
a case of what magicians describe as “ending clean,” meaning
that S is free to search or interrogate the situation because,
without the required memories, no discrediting evidence can
be discovered. The final believed action and method action
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World at time 6
States and actions
believed action α5 entails: slidedown(M, turnedpaperup, CT)
method action β5 entails: slidedown(M, turnedpaperup, UCT
′)
expected state 86 entails: CT & turnedpaperdown {Meaning the paper turned to point downwards and in the down position below the coins.}
believed state ψ6 entails: UCT & turnedpaperdown
method state λ6 entails: UCT
′ & turnedpaperdown
ψ5 → [α5 ] 86 {From previous time 5, ψ5 entails: CT & turnedpaperup.}
Spectator experience
impossible(S, believes(S, ψ6 ) & expects(S, 86) & ψ6 = ¬86 )
S experiences the situation as impossible because there is a contradiction between the current believed state and the expectation.
Support for the (false) expectation
expects(S, 86)← believed(S, ψ5) & believes(S, DONE(α5)) & believes(S, ψ5 → [α5] 86)
Where,
believes(S, DONE(α5))← perceived(S, β5) & structurally_equivalent(S, α5,β5)
structurally_equivalent(S, α5, β5) means: discoverable_evidence(S, α5 ) = discoverable_evidence(S, β5)
This asserts that the false final expectation comes about in the same way as earlier expectations, but now rests on believing that the preceding state ψ5 was true
and that action α5 was done and that normally this should lead to φ6. And α5 is believed to have occurred because the method action β5 was perceived and it is
structurally equivalent to α5.
Support for the contradictory final believed state ψ6 comes now purely from perception:
believes(S, ψ6)← perceives(S, λ6) & structurally_equivalent(S, ψ6,λ6)
Where,
structurally_equivalent(S, ψ6,λ6) means: discoverable_evidence(S, ψ6) = discoverable_evidence(S, λ6)
Asserting that belief in ψ6 comes now purely from perception of the situation λ6, as M understands it, and the evidence relationship of structural equivalence between
ψ6 and λ6.
are also structurally equivalent to each other because, although
the sliding down of the paper is itself potentially congruent
across the two situations, as the coins are revealed they
gradually exhibit the potentially discriminable inconsistencies
just described.
OBSERVATIONS AND ISSUES ARISING
FROM THE ANALYSIS OF IMPOSSIBILITY
Conjuring is a rich and sophisticated craft and its tricks
are designed and performed to work at different levels of
spectators’ understanding. Our account has focused on just
one level, the arrangement of a trick’s events to construct a
history of beliefs leading to the experience of impossibility.
At the risk of reductionism, we have not considered how this
co-exists with the higher narrative level of conjuring tricks
that creates meaning and emotional affect for spectators, as
stressed by many magicians (e.g., Sharpe, 1932; Burger and
Neale, 2009). Most notably, we have defined the experience
of impossibility as encountering a situation that produces a
striking contradiction between a perception-supported believed
state and a memory-supported expected state. For magicians, the
associated emotional reaction of spectators is paramount, and
they strive to achieve something akin to a “sense of wonder”
as described by Rensink and Kuhn (2015). Much of the skill
of a magician lies in avoiding spectators adopting what Kelley
(1980) called a “problem-solving” mode, of searching for the
“actual” method sequence of events, and instead enabling them
to accept and enjoy the magical effect sequence on its own
terms. In this way, spectators may momentarily experience the
outcome of a trick as not simply an anomalous event, but
more as something that suggests different possibilities in the
laws of nature akin to people’s belief in real magic (Subbotsky,
2010).
Nevertheless, we contend that such higher-level affective
responses in conjuring rest on striking and unavoidable
contradictions at the level of perception and cognition. Hence we
offer the present analysis as an account of how conjuring tricks
are constructed to produce outcomes that seem to be logically at
odds with our expectations. Even at this level of analysis, some
further qualifications of our account are needed. One is that we
have not considered events which work as perceptual illusions.
These underlie many tricks, for example the vanishing ball trick
(Kuhn and Land, 2006), by exploiting hard-wired properties
of visual perception to deliver up false percepts, the basis of
which are not accessible to direct scrutiny and hence are said
to be cognitively impenetrable (Pylyshyn, 1984). In contrast, the
evidence relationships we have identified (similarity, perceptual
equivalence, structural equivalence, and congruence) are all
cognitively penetrable in that they are not hard-wired results but
are susceptible to cognitive interrogation. Another simplification
in our account is that we consider memory supported beliefs
as correctly registering the information that was previously
attended to, while often the impact of a trick rests on significant
distortions in the way events are remembered, both in short-term
memory and when the trick is recounted much later (Wiseman
and Lamont, 1996).
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Another important aspect of our account is its detailed focus
on just one simple trick. We have described a common, but not
universal, pattern in which evidence relationships are relatively
strong at the beginning and end of the trick and weaker in
the middle when the greater part of the secret work is done
to separate the actual and believed situations. It should be
noted that other successful tricks employ different patterns,
and many end on effects that rely on weaker relationships
of similarity or perceptual equivalence. Such tricks typically
require an extra “clean up” phase to remove their vulnerability
to discovery, often by moving swiftly on to the next trick.
What we have shown in our account, therefore, is not a
definitive pattern, but rather an illustration of a set of relevant
concepts for interpreting the various ways that impossibility is
constructed. Nor are these concepts intended to be exhaustive,
for example there are likely to be other kinds of evidence
relationship.
Notwithstanding these qualifications, we have attempted
to demonstrate that the construction of impossibility in
conjuring requires something more than isolated misperceived
and/or misattended events. Although these are typically vital
ingredients, impossible effects are created through the whole
sequence of events making up a trick’s performance, both
veridical and false; an idea well-grounded in magicians’ key
instructional texts. To sketch the beginnings of a simple logical
framework for how the experience of impossibility is constructed,
we started with the notion of it as a contradiction between a
perception-supported belief about a situation and a memory-
supported expectation for the same situation. The experience
is characterized by an inability to resolve the contradiction of
believing in both of these states, despite them being in logical
opposition to each other, because neither the final believed state
nor the final expected state can be rejected in favor of the other.
Developing this further, and extending the analysis of Kelley
(1980), we have proposed that the history of a trick’s events can
be understood as two parallel sequences: an effect sequence of
believed states and actions, and a method sequence of “actual”
or method states and actions. The sequence of method states λ1
to λn incrementally transforms an initial situation into one that
gives rise to a believed state ψn that is in strong contradiction
with the expected state8n (as shown in Figures 1, 2). In contrast
to the spectators’ sense of a sudden magical and inexplicable
state transformation, the method state gradually undergoes
many smaller changes, each designed to remain undetected
and unsuspected. In our account, then, the construction of
impossibility is seen to be diffused across the trick’s event
history.
Based on this account, we will now propose three further
principles related to the construction of impossibility that might
be added to our initial set based on our reading of magicians’
texts, comprising naturalness, the whole, clarity, focus, the
incidental, blurring perception and inference, no-notice and early
denial. The three further principles are not intended as being
new to magicians, but rather they are so deeply implicit in their
craft that they are typically not made explicit in instructional
texts.
The Principle of Equivalence
Our analysis of Martin Gardner’s Turnabout, has illustrated
what can be called the principle of equivalence, referring to the
management of different kinds of evidence relationship over
a trick’s history. It was seen that each state of the method
sequence gave off perceptual evidence to support a corresponding
believed state within the effect sequence. Likewise for actions.
We identified four kinds of evidence relationship that might
hold for any pair of states or actions: similarity (the weakest) in
which they appear similar but inconsistencies could be detected
through greater scrutiny; perceptual equivalence, in which
they give off identical perceptual evidence but inconsistencies
could be revealed by intervening in the situation to get
new evidence; structural equivalence in which they give off
identical perceptual evidence but inconsistencies could be found
through comparison with memories of earlier states; and finally
congruence (the strongest) in which there are no inconsistencies
between corresponding pairs of believed and method states or
actions.
It has been seen how the impossible outcome depends
on the careful design and performance of these evidence
relationships over the course of the trick. Significantly, there is
an alignment of evidence strength with the level of scrutiny to
be faced. The construction of the trick is built around relatively
strong evidence relationships, of congruence and structural
equivalence, at its beginning and at its final impossible event.
Both the beginning and end of the trick (state 1 and state
6) are times of high spectator scrutiny. The impossibility of
the final event triggers the highest scrutiny, but the opening
of the trick is also heavily scrutinized as the situation is
first established. In contrast, the middle events of the trick
are characterized by the weaker relationships of similarity
and perceptual equivalence. However, these events face far
lower scrutiny because they are non-magical and aligned with
expectations that are built through the effect sequence. Hence,
the trick is designed with strongest evidence meeting greatest
scrutiny, and weakest evidence meeting weakest scrutiny. Also
important is that the construction of the trick depends on
the limits of recovering information from memory. While the
impossible final event is subject to great perceptual scrutiny, as
the spectator attempts to resolve its inherent contradiction, the
weaker evidence of the trick’s middle events cannot be subject to
such scrutiny in retrospect and cannot be intervened in for more
evidence.
The Principle of Substitutable Elements
and the Principle of Stable Occlusion
There are two further principles associated with our analysis that
we have not yet discussed, and again they are deeply implicit
in the magician’s craft. They both express general properties of
apparatus used by magicians that are not explicitly named in
conjuring texts but which are ubiquitous and instrumental in
supporting the construction of impossibility in the way described
here. The first, that we call the principle of substitutable elements,
is that magical apparatus typically contains repeating elements
(cards, coins, cups, balls, rings, walls of cabinets) where one
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is not easily distinguishable from another in many situations.
Even in 1584, Reginald Scot identified three types of magic “with
balls, with cards and with money” (Dawes, 1979, p. 17), all
of which support substitution. The trick Turnabout has been
seen to rely on the spectator perceiving a false correspondence
of coins between upwards-pointing and downwards-pointing
coin triangles (see Figure 2). This is only possible because the
spectator does not attend to the individuating features of each
coin, such as orientation or blemishes, and hence they become
substitutable for each other. The result is that the magically
upside-down triangle of coins (UCT) is indistinguishable
from, and hence structurally equivalent to, the actual final
configuration (UCT′). In his analysis of magic in terms of causal
attribution, Kelley drew a comparison between this substitution
of elements in conjuring and apparent motion effects as in the phi
phenomenon.
The second principle about magic apparatus, that we will
call the principle of stable occlusion, concerns the way various
aspects of a situation can be partially covered and uncovered
from the spectator’s view. A person is placed inside a box to
be sawn in half, a rabbit appears from inside a hat, cards can
be turned face down, balls placed under cups, and coins held
in closed hands. Without objects or aspects of objects moving
temporarily in and out of view, there is little scope to perform
secret actions, or to suspend the moment when the results of
secret actions are revealed. A critically important aspect, hence
our reference to stable occlusion, is that an effective apparatus
must be such that spectators have complete confidence that the
concealed objects, or object parts, are not vulnerable to unseen
changes: a face down card on an open table will retain its
identity; a ball under a cup on a solid table cannot be secretly
accessed. It is only when spectator are completely confident that
a hidden thing cannot be changed, that they are astonished when
it has.
In general, the principle of substitutable elements in apparatus
supports the creation of structural equivalence between effect
and method, because repeating elements (like coins, face-down
cards, cups and balls) can be passed off as each other; with no
form of detection other than comparing them against memories
of earlier events. The principle of stable occlusion, on the other
hand, supports the creation of perceptual equivalence, because
the hidden parts of a situation can become discrepant from the
believed state while the visible parts remain consistent.
CONCLUSION
The experiences of impossibility created by magic tricks are
unusual cognitions and emotions that require a different kind of
explanation to those given for how events are misperceived or
misattended. We have presented one approach to understanding
the cognitive aspects of impossibility through an analysis of its
logical form considered as a contradiction between an expected
state and a believed state. For this sense of impossibility to persist
depends on the contradiction remaining unresolvable. This in
turn depends on strong perceptual evidence for the current
believed state and equally strong memory-based support for the
conflicting expected state. Our account offers an explanation for
how this situation can be created through the constructional
aspects of a conjuring trick, implying the way that its events are
organized over the course of the whole performance. We have
described how two event sequences run in parallel throughout—
an effect sequence and a method sequence—and how the trick is
carefully designed to manage what we have called the evidence
relationships between them.
The logic-based account that we have presented is at an
early stage, focussing on the most rudimentary aspects of a
simple single-effect conjuring trick. It is a long way off capturing
the many significant subtleties of conjuring, even within the
perspective of cognitive belief formation; such as multiple
effects within a routine, pretended failures, and double bluffs.
Nevertheless, our account takes a first step by demonstrating that
the impossible outcome of even the simplest of tricks depends on
a carefully designed and performed history of events and beliefs.
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